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Abstract 
Using the little-known BBC Monitoring Service (BBCM) archives, this article shows how Romanian 
governments in the period 1938-1948 chose to represent themselves via the medium of radio to the 
rest of the world. After introducing the BBCM and discussing the problems of using such Open 
Source Intelligence (OSINT) material, the article shows how four key aspects of Romanian history 
were presented by the Romanian authorities at this time: the wartime expropriation of Jews prior to 
their planned deportation; Romania’s changing of sides in the war as of 23 August 1944; the return 
of Jewish deportees after the war; and the communist governments’ changing attitudes towards 
Palestine/Israel and Jewish emigration. The article suggests that these sources are highly revealing 
but that they need to be used with considerable caution when trying to understand the tumultuous 
events of wartime Romanian history. 
 
 
During the years 1938-48 Romania went through a series of remarkable changes. From a 
parliamentary democracy until February 1938 when King Carol II established a “royal dictatorship”, 
to a fascist state between December 1940 and February 1941, to a fascist regime-cum-military 
dictatorship from February 1940 until August 1944, to a communist satellite of the Soviet Union, 
Romania was not simply caught between the machinations of the superpowers. Certainly the 
Romanian decision to ally itself with Nazi Germany — taken before Ion Antonescu came to power — 
was made out of fear that this represented the only chance of retaining some independence and 
having the possibility of regaining lands ceded to the USSR (Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia) and 
Hungary (Northern Transylvania) in June and August 1940 respectively. The fact that the choice was 
Hitler’s Germany rather than Stalin’s Soviet Union tells something about the country’s political 
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culture: monarchist, nationalist, xenophobic, with a longstanding antisemitic consensus and, despite 
Bucharest’s interwar cosmopolitanism, by 1938 moving decisively into Germany’s orbit. But 
geopolitics were just as, if not more significant: the tendency towards Germany was bolstered by 
widespread fear of communism, which was by no means particular to Romania but which was given 
added force by virtue of the fact that the USSR had territorial claims against Romania whereas 
Germany did not. And it gained further traction after the German invasion of Poland, when the 
Romanians could see for themselves the ineffectiveness of Anglo-French guarantees. In short order, 
the country lost a third of its territory, following which King Carol II, under German pressure, was 
forced to offer dictatorial powers to General Antonescu and then to abdicate in favour of his son 
Mihai. At first Antonescu shared power with the Iron Guard, with the Guard’s leader, Horia Sima, 
appointed Deputy Prime Minister when the “National Legionary State” was declared on 14 
September 1940. After a few chaotic months, characterised by Iron Guard violence, culminating in 
the Bucharest pogrom of January 1941 in which 120 Jews were murdered, Antonescu dissolved the 
National Legionary State on 14 February and established a new government which offered less 
wayward rule, a more stable partnership with Germany, and, in Antonescu’s eyes at least, a stronger 
likelihood of regaining northern Transylvania. “The road to northern Transylvania”, writes Dennis 
Deletant, “lay through Russia and allegiance to Hitler” – or so Antonescu believed.1 
 
Antonescu, soon promoted to Marshal, ruled Romania until, with the Red Army approaching and the 
conducător (leader) remaining indecisive, the young King Mihai (Michael) intervened and on 23 
August 1944 engineered the country’s switch of sides just in time to try and stave off the indignity of 
Soviet defeat and humiliating terms.2 Instead the coup bought Mihai about six months before the 
Soviet occupation was being presented as a friendly operation in the final struggle against “Hitlerite 
and Horthyite Fascism”, as Romania swiftly turned into a communist country – now with the 
humiliation presented as being the will of the Romanian people. This last change was perhaps the 
most remarkable given that Romania’s indigenous communist party (RCP), outlawed throughout the 
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interwar and wartime period, numbered no more than 1,000 members, some 800 of whom were in 
prison. “Romania’s external position immediately after the coup”, Deletant reminds us, “was that of 
an independent state waging war against its former allies on the side of its former enemies.”3 Or, as 
Nikita Khrushchev put it, Romania, like Hungary, was one of “our involuntary allies.”4 The rapid 
incorporation of Romania as part of the Soviet Union’s sphere of interest in Eastern Europe signalled 
the fact that, as with Poland, Stalin wanted to ensure that a “friendly” regime was in place, first to 
recognise the border changes that were in effect at the end of the war (the Soviet occupation of 
Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, the latter of which was to become the Soviet Republic of 
Moldova5) and, second, to prevent any resurgence of fascism – in other words, to secure Soviet 
security, which was Stalin’s main aim after World War II. By March 1945, the interim governments of 
Sănătescu and Rădescu had been replaced by the Soviets’ nominee, Petru Groza. In November 1947 
the Social Democratic Party was forcibly merged with the Communist Party to create the Romanian 
Workers’ Party and in December 1947, with Mihai’s forced abdication, the communist takeover was 
complete. 
 
These changes were observed by, among many others, the BBC Monitoring Service (BBCM). BBCM is 
an example of what is now referred to as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), that is, an example of a 
source other than a “secret” one that can be used to understand one’s adversary’s thinking and 
behaviour.6 This concept was crucial to the founding of the CIA in 1947 but, since the age of the 
Internet, it has received a great deal of attention from intelligence agencies and scholars alike.7 
BBCM was set up when war broke out in 1939 and began operating on 1 January 1940. Its role was 
not merely to translate and transcribe foreign radio broadcasts – especially useful in countries where 
BBC journalists were banned –  but to assess them. Accordingly, the BBCM monitors produced a 
daily and weekly “Digest” of the broadcasts, selecting what they considered the most significant, 
which was passed on to the relevant government departments, including the Ministry of 
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Information, which had been responsible for conceiving of the service in the first place. In other 
words, BBCM has been one tool in the government’s armoury of international diplomacy.  
 
The archives of BBCM are held at the Imperial War Museum’s site at Duxford, near Cambridge. Its 
size is remarkable, with boxes of transcripts from around the world, including China, the USSR, India 
and many other countries. Although stored at IWM Duxford, the archives are owned by the BBC. 
Thanks to an initiative of the IWM – a research project headed by Suzanne Bardgett, Head of 
Research at IWM – researchers were permitted access to the archive for a brief period during 2015. 
Given that the UK is generally regarded as a good example (if not as good as the US) when it comes 
to archival access, it is worth noting that the BBC, a public body which is funded by British tax-
payers’ television licence fees, only allowed researchers into the archive for a brief period, would not 
allow them to download, copy or print the documents, and has since reclosed the archive, which 
remains currently inaccessible.8 This article is based on a visit to the archive in November 2015, in 
the context of the IWM research project on BBCM, when I examined the transcripts of Romanian 
broadcasts. This is a small collection in comparison to those from the world’s major powers, but it 
nevertheless provides a fascinating insight into how a geopolitically crucial country sought to portray 
itself to the outside world in the context of the momentous events of the mid-twentieth century. 
 
In the first full-length academic study of BBCM, Laura Johnson rightly observes that “the BBC 
Monitoring Service archives are a selective record of broadcasting, they are not the media sources 
themselves”; in other words, the role played by the monitors in translating and shaping the material 
needs to be considered.9 Even so, the files allow us to come close to accessing the representation of 
the events through the words of the Romanian radio service. Of course, one needs to bear in mind 
that the transcripts have been translated, which itself raises the possibility that, as Hilary Footitt 
notes, a failure to problematize the translated text might “mask the extent to which translating itself 
can domesticate a foreign text , screening out key aspects of its essential foreignness, a process 
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which could encourage recipients of translation to maintain a type of cultural parochialism in which 
translated texts tend to be compared with what is known – similar texts and situations in English – 
rather than provoking speculation on what may be as yet unknown, and as yet, in intelligence terms, 
unthinkable.”10 Nevertheless, with the BBCM, translated texts are what we have to work with.  
 
The shift from fascist-cum-military dictatorship to communism is especially striking, as of course is 
the gulf in just about every report between what the broadcasters claimed – irrespective of which 
regime was in control – and the facts as they can be discovered from other sources. One can write 
history on the basis of the BBCM reports on Romania, but it would be a history that veered widely 
from an understanding of the same events from the perspective of post-communist, twenty-first 
century Europe. Before 23 August 1944, the monitoring reports describe the unleashing of the war 
as a result of an international Jewish conspiracy to undermine the Romanian people. After that date, 
they present ongoing events as the triumph of the Romanian working people against the fascist 
oppression unleashed by big business and foreign, especially German and Hungarian capital. In other 
words, for historians to use the BBCM reports in the Romanian context, a good dose of source 
criticism is necessary, and the broadcasts – in themselves fascinating – need to be placed alongside 
other documents, even if one’s interest is solely in the self-portrayal or propaganda of fascism or 
communism. The BBCM sources are transcripts of sources “from above”, i.e. official positions, which 
are often uniform and ideologically straitjacketed; they need to be supplemented by sources “from 
below”, i.e. testimonies of everyday life in Romania as well as by sources that come from outside 
observers.11 This article will examine the BBC Monitoring reports as they concern four 
representative moments: the wartime expropriation of Jews prior to their planned deportation; 
Romania’s changing of sides in the war as of 23 August 1944; the return of Jewish deportees after 
the war; and the communist governments’ changing attitudes towards Palestine/Israel and Jewish 
emigration. 
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Persecution of the Jews 
 
This contrast between the sources and the reality is readily apparent with respect to the treatment 
of the Jews in Romania. The authorities were by no means shy of advertising their decisions to 
expropriate Jewish property and, in general, to remove the Jews from Romanian economic and 
social life. For example, a broadcast of 3 April 1941 reported on measures taken in that vein: 
 
A lengthy explanation was given as to the significance of the Rumanian Decree-Law by 
which the land property owned by the Jews was expropriated by the Rumanian State. 
All kinds of factories were by this measure also expropriated by the State and the work 
of Rumanisation was thus enabled. The Under Secretary of State for Rumanisation takes 
care that the necessary measures should be carried out in the interest of the state. The 
Rumanian authorities are careful to prevent any abuses which could occur by the 
transfer of Jewish property to the ownership of the State.12 
 
A broadcast one month later added that "A National ‘Center of Romanisation’ has been created 
which will issue several decrees: the expropriation of Jews, replacing Jews by Rumanians in all 
establishments etc. This center is also going to control the Economic life and the Finance.” It also 
reported in a news flash that a new law had been passed forbidding Jews to trade in cereals.13 The 
next day further detail was added in a broadcast to European countries outside of Romania: 
 
The decree concerning the expropriation of Jewish property is an important step in the 
nationalisation policy of the Government. It concerns big and small enterprises, such as 
mills, bakeries, alcohol distilling plants, refineries, factories of medical drugs, all mining 
rights and property of mineral resources such as oil, railways, telegraph and telephone 
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companies. All these must be transferred to the state free of debts. An undersecretary 
of state for Rumanisation and colonisation will be appointed who is to watch over the 
legal carrying out of the transfer. The Government will pay for the property in form of 
annuations. By this measure the skilled workers among the refugees from the ceded 
territories can be again introduced into the economic system.14 
 
The same broadcast also observed the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Ion Constantin Brătianu, 
“one of the founders of the Rumanian state.” It summed up his achievement thus: “He was the 
creator of the alliance with Germany and Italy, and succeeded in annulling the demands of the Berlin 
Congress for the emancipation of Jews in Rumania.” This condensation of Brătianu’s life into a 
foreshadowing of the Axis aimed to provide the Antonescu regime with a respectable pedigree and 
set the attacks on the Jews into a context of long-term nation-building. The government did indeed 
establish on 3 May 1941 a National Centre for Romanianisation (Centrul Naţional de Românizare), 
tasked with “romanianising economic life” and paying compensation to Jewish property owners.15 
This compensation, which undervalued property by more than 75%, was of course never paid.16 
 
But there was more to the measures against the Jews than an attempt to redistribute wealth from 
the small Romanian middle class (which included many Jews) to the poor Romanian peasantry. If the 
aim were simply to boost economic development and undertake programmes of “modernisation”, 
then attacking the Jews made no sense – they were already contributing to the Romanian economy, 
the Jews of the Regat (the “Old Kingdom” of Moldavia and Wallachia) thought of themselves as 
Romanian and the Jews of Banat and Transylvania, though often of German or Hungarian speaking 
backgrounds, could have been regarded by a state with less narrow ethnic aims as net contributors 
to national life. As Jewish doctor and writer Emil Dorian asked in his diary with respect to his 
landlord, how has the situation changed “if the exorbitant rents go into the pocket of a Gentile 
rather than a Jewish exploiter?”17 But the fact is that since 1918 and the creation of “Greater 
8 
 
Romania” as part of the postwar settlement, the Romanian state had been devoted to a project of 
national homogenisation of which minorities, especially Germans, Hungarians, Jews and Roma, were 
the targets. “The elimination of the foreign element”, said Antonescu, “depends on its replacement 
by local forces in the spirit of the fullest integrity.”18 
 
The Antonescu regime offered a more extreme version of the Romanianisation policy that had been 
developing in response to the new constitution of 1923, which had granted Jews civil rights. Just 
before the establishment of King Carol’s royal dictatorship in February 1938, Octavian Goga’s short-
lived antisemitic government (December 1937-February 1938) reversed many of the Jews’ 
rights,which Carol never abrogated.19 Ion Gigurtu, then head of government under the royal 
dictatorship, introduced Nuremberg-style laws in 1940 just before Antonescu took power with the 
Iron Guard. Not only did Antonescu’s regime take radical measures to steal property from Jews, 
leaving them destitute, but it murdered them too. The Romanian army was the third largest in the 
Axis (after the Wehrmacht and the Japanese army). Following the occupation of the part of western 
Ukraine between the Dniester and Bug rivers, the Germans and Romanians agreed at Tiraspol (17 
August 1941) and Tighina (30 August) to name the area Transnistria, run by the Romanians from 
Odessa but allowing the Germans control of major railway lines and the port of Odessa. Jews were 
deported there from Bukovina and Bessarabia. Together with the local Jews, including the Jews of 
Odessa, they were killed there in large numbers or were left to starve or freeze to death in the 
inhospitable environment. The largest single massacre occurred at Bogdanovka in Golta county, 
when in December 1941 some 4,000-5,000 Jews were burned alive in a stable block and a further 
43,000 shot in a local forest.20 
 
Although Antonescu is not regarded by historians as having been as radical as Hitler and the leading 
Nazis, he nevertheless held a world view which regarded Jews as Bolsheviks and as an existential 
threat to the Romanian nation. In an interview with the Italian newspaper La Stampa, for example, 
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Antonescu explained that the largest problem facing Goga in 1938 had been the “Jewish problem”. 
Explaining that Jews controlled the Romanian economy, Antonescu proposed to resolve the Jewish 
problem “in the course of the reorganisation of the state, substituting Jews with Romanians step by 
step, and in the first instance with legionaries who will in the meantime prepare themselves. The 
Jews’ property will for the most part be expropriated in exchange for compensation. … Jews will be 
able to live in but will not be able to be beneficiaries of the resources and wealth of this country. In 
Romania, Romanians have to live and be valued above all: the others, if there is space left, come 
after them.”21 Antonescu shared with Hitler a paranoid fear of “Judeo-Bolshevism” and stated that 
“Satan is the Jew”.22 If he proved to be more pragmatic in his attitude towards the Jews than Hitler, 
who never wavered from his chiliastic vision of the Jews as the poisoners of the Aryan race, 
Antonescu’s fear of Jewish treachery and economic exploitation nevertheless made Romania 
responsible for killing somewhere between 300,000 and 350,000 Jews as it sought to solve its 
“Jewish question” in “the Romanian way” until Antonescu changed his mind in October 1942, 
abandoning plans to deport Jews from the Regat, Banat and Transylvania.23 Among the reasons 
contributing to this decision, the economic one – i.e. the failure of plans to “Romanianise” the 
economy in the way envisaged by the regime – was not the least relevant.24 
 
 
Romania Changes Sides 
 
These events suddenly took on new meanings with the change of regime after August 1944, and 
their reflection in the Romanian broadcasts gives us an insight into how the new governments 
wanted to portray themselves to the Romanian people, to the Soviets and to the rest of the world. 
They indicate what was regarded as important enough to broadcast, how post-Antonescu Romania 
was to be conceived and, vitally, they indicate what the new regime did not want to talk about. 
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The most pressing news was of course the change of regime itself, which was presented in the most 
positive way possible.  
 
King Michael today formally restored the democratic constitution of Rumania by re-
establishing the 1923 constitution which had been suspended by his father, King Carol. 
Until a national legislature can be elected, its powers will be exercised by the King and 
his Cabinet, in which all the Democratic Parties, including the Communists, are 
represented. All dictatorial powers bestowed on the Premier by various decrees under 
the Antonescu regime are abolished by today’s Act. All anti-Jewish decrees and laws 
passed under the Antonescu regime have also been annulled and thousands of Jewish 
doctors, lawyers, teachers and others who were driven from those professions by those 
laws are automatically reinstated, though thousands of others did not survive to benefit 
by this new reform. At the same time, to keep things in hand here the Government has 
warned the Press of the reintroduction of Press control, which was dropped after the 
Palace revolution of 23rd August. Papers have been told that they must publish nothing 
on military and political matters which is not in accordance with official directives.25 
 
A few days later, a broadcast in French insisted that the coup was no sudden, unplanned action but 
that it had long been prepared:  
 
The Socialist leader Constantin Petresco gave the Socialist paper “Libertatea” details of 
how the coup d’état on 23rd August was prepared. He said this was not a spontaneous 
action, but one which had been long prepared for by the four main parties which, 
although dissolved, had continued their underground activity.26  
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Even more important, the same broadcast was at pains to stress that Mihai had always intended to 
take such action and was never tempted to leave the country: 
 
Berne: A Rumanian living in Britain recently published in a British paper an article 
stating that King Michael had sought advice from the allies, and from some Rumanians 
living abroad, as to whether he should seek refuge abroad, and he had been advised not 
to leave the country. We are authorised emphatically to deny this assertion. The King 
never thought of leaving for abroad and asked for no advice. On the contrary, he did not 
hesitate for a minute in preparing the action carried out on 23rd August, and for which 
his presence was as natural as it was indispensable.27 
 
At the same time, the BBC was also picking up the broadcasts made by the remnants of the former 
regime, including this stirring statement by Horia Sima, the leader of the Iron Guard: 
 
Rumanians! During the last few days the question of Transylvania has been reopened, 
and it has come to fighting between Rumanians and Hungarians. You must realise that 
this problem is painful to us – and particularly to us who never lost faith in the 
nationalist front and are carrying on the struggle against Bolshevism. But this 
Rumanian-Hungarian conflict at this time serves neither of the two parties, only the 
Judeo-Bolshevik plans. Their primary intention is for the Nationalist forces to exhaust 
each other so that the Bolsheviks can more easily penetrate into the heart of Europe 
and instal [sic] the Communist regime more speedily in the countries they have entered. 
Rumanians! Refuse to be deceived by current events. There is a peril which at this 
moment overshadows all territorial problems, for it threatens our people’s very life. It is 
Judeo-Bolshevism. World Jewry takes advantage of this sacred problem of our people 
solely as a means of agitation in its own interests. … In the new Europe of tomorrow, 
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the problem of nationalities will be settled by Adolf Hitler in a spirit of justice and in 
accordance with the sacrifices which every nation has made for the sake of the final 
victory of the new world. Rumanians!  Retain your calm and dignity. Refuse to be 
diverted from the main problem of this hour, the Judeo-Bolshevik menace, and 
concentrate all your energies and fighting spirit in this direction alone.28 
 
At this point Sima was in Vienna, and as the Third Reich collapsed he was able to find his way to 
Madrid, where he lived until 1993, penning anti-communist and Legionary tirades. The title of the 
monitor’s report suggests that in September 1944 the situation was still sufficiently in flux for the 
BBC to refer to Sima as a representative of the enemy-controlled “Rumanian national government”; 
since Sima was regarded by the Nazis as the head of a puppet “government-in-exile” this designation 
was understandable. 
 
Yet in reality, given the Soviet advance, there was no likelihood of a fascist revival in Romania. 
Rather, the first broadcasts after 23 August were designed to show that the new King was trying to 
negotiate a path between the Western Allies and the Soviets. He wanted to win time to hold free 
elections, keeping the Allies to their word as given at Yalta. Yet this shaky state of affairs stood no 
chance in the face of the Soviet determination to control Romania. The new realities soon became 
entrenched and by autumn 1944 the Romanian press was celebrating more forcefully the newfound 
friendship between the Romanians and the Soviets on the one hand and the rallying round King 
Mihai on the other. Later such broadcasts were designed to channel nationalist sentiment in a pro-
Soviet direction, but as the following report indicates, whilst Sănătescu was still head of government 
the press was advertising the attempt, by defending the King, of keeping Romania from total 
subordination to the Soviet Union: 
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King Michael’s Birthday. All Rumania celebrates to-day the anniversary of King Michael’s 
birth. The Rumanian nation rallies round the King whose fate is bound with it for ever. 
[Reference to 23rd August, “which brought about a decisive change in Rumania’s 
destiny.”] King Michael is a King of justice, and on today’s anniversary the Rumanian 
people expresses faith in him.  (Rumanian national anthem.) The Rumanian premier, 
Gen. Constantin Sanatescu, today sent a telegram of greetings to King Michael in the 
name of the Government expressing its unshakeable faith and devotion.29 
 
The Romanian government was not so naïve as to think it could stay within the Western orbit but 
such broadcasts reflected policies that were designed to mitigate the worst effects of Soviet 
occupation. They were to be in vain. 
 
One illustration of how the communists triumphed is found in the BBCM’s recording of the trials of 
war criminals in Romania. As in the rest of what would soon become the region east of the “iron 
curtain”, war crimes trials in Romania served a dual purpose: convicting those alleged to be fascist 
criminals and reorganising society, eliminating “kulaks”, large landowners, and entrepreneurs – in 
short, the middle class and bourgeoisie.30 Even though the People’s Tribunals followed the 
indictments set out in the Nuremberg International Charter (8 August 1945), the social context, legal 
framework of the court, and the vocabulary of the prosecution made it clear that the crimes were to 
be understood in terms of a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of class struggle. 
 
For example, with respect to the trial of those in charge at the aforementioned massacre in 
Bogdanovka, the guilt of the accused was presupposed through the use of evocative (and typically 
communist) terms such as “hangman” and “assassins” and through painting a picture of a united 
public, shocked and dismayed at the actions of the criminals amongst them: 
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The interrogation of the war criminals at the People’s Court continues. The President 
questioned Popescu, the Bogdanovka Camp hangman, who said he had taken the 
deportees' valuables to prevent profiteers from dealing in them. He admitted the 
deportees were given nothing in return. Asked whether he had organised the massacre 
of 48,000 people in the camp, Popescu cynically replied that the number was certainly 
not above 15,000. At this the public voiced its resentment and indignation. Questioned 
further he explained that typhus had broken out and to prevent a worse disaster, this 
massacre was decided upon. 
 
Sub-Prefect Aristide Padure was questioned next and admitted sending deportees to 
camps where slow death awaited them. 
 
Praetor (?Bodei) who, when tens of thousands of internees were starving at the 
Bogdanovka Camp, ran a bakery producing only 100 loaves a day, and Sgt. (Melinescu?) 
were also questioned. The latter admitted he had ordered gendarmes to beat inmates. 
His testimony is valuable because he saw the massacre. He told the President that 
about 14,000 people were killed, and more were dying every day. The Public Prosecutor 
asked: “Does the accused know that the old, sick and children were shot and their 
bodies burned in front of the living?” after a minute’s reflection the Sergeant replied: 
“Such things happened after festivities.” 
 
These then are the assassins and their misdeeds. The proceedings of the People’s Court 
continue.31 
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Another broadcast, two days later, followed up with the somewhat implausible claim that all of the 
war criminals had been indicted and once again making a clear separation between these “bad 
apples” and the general public: 
 
Prof. P. Constantinescu-Iasi, Minister of Propaganda, interviewed by the “Victoria” 
correspondent, said that public opinion was satisfied that all war criminals responsible 
for Rumania’s disaster have now been committed for trial. It was the duty of all 
conscientious citizens to condemn those responsible for the horrors committed, the 
massacres of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, and the ruin of provinces. By 
expressing their desire for the severe punishment of war criminals, the people of 
Rumania must dissociate themselves from the Fascist criminals.32 
 
The authorities insisted that the 44 meetings organised by the Patriotic Union in Bucharest indicated 
that “Thousands of civilians, representing all social strata, showed their hostility towards those who 
committed the basest brutalities and atrocities, and demanded their punishment.” There was, said 
Minister Prof. Vlădescu-Răcoasa, “no excuse for war criminals wearing uniforms and attempting to 
plead that they only carried out orders, because military regulations forbid looting and murder.”33 
Here, indeed, the Romanians anticipated the Nuremberg defence and its dismissal by the tribunal.  
 
Nevertheless, the broadcasts were overall highly misleading. The fact is that the Bucharest Tribunal 
sentenced a mere 187 people. Of those, 48 were sentenced to death but only four were actually 
executed, with the rest being commuted to hard labour or sentenced in absentia. In the Cluj 
Tribunal, the sentences were harsher, a fact which reflected the region’s occupation by the 
Hungarians. As Michael Shafir notes, the claim that the Hungarians and not the Romanians were 
responsible for the Holocaust, a position which dominated communist-era historiography, derives 
from the period of the trials.34 Still, as early as 1950, many war criminals were released and joined 
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the RCP. The Jews were depicted as victims of the Germans and the Hungarians and the returnees 
were denied justice. Indeed, RCP Secretary Vasile Luca stated in October 1945 that “There are 
almost no deportees left in misery. They have become multimillionaires.”35 
 
 
Jewish Returnees 
 
Immediately after Romania changed sides and long before the end of the war, Romanian radio 
reported on the travails of Jewish refugees. For example, on 27 October 1944, one broadcast 
focused on the case of a group of refugees crossing Bulgaria: 
 
Twentyfifth October onehundredforty Rumanian refugees including children crossed 
Bulgaria enroute Palestine. Bulgarian Redcross accompanied children to Turkish border. 
Refugees thanked authorities who arranged transit. Adults reported critical economic 
situation Rumanian Jews caused by Nazis and fascist Rumanian persecution. Stated they 
considered their duty to appeal to dots of world to help Rumanian Jews coming 
winter.36 
 
The same broadcast reported on Jew-baiting in Bulgaria, on the liberation of the Serbian town of 
Negotin (near the Romanian and Bulgarian borders), in which only one Jewish family was left, having 
been in hiding, and on how Jews from the same town were now “with Tito”. 
 
At the same time the broadcasters reported that Romania was threatening to take a bellicose stance 
towards Germany and Hungary if they mistreated Romanians, including Jews: 
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In view of reports from refugees of the danger threatening the lives of Rumanians 
conscripted for labour, and of Jews deported from northern Transylvania to Germany 
and Hungary, or in German-occupied territories, the Rumanian Government has 
intervened with the International Red Cross asking for an investigation. The 
Government has also requested the Swiss Government to inform Berlin and Budapest 
that it will take reprisals against German and Hungarian nationals in Rumania, and 
against the members of the respective ethnical groups.37 
 
Such reports were certainly a marked change from the Antonescu regime; this expression of concern 
for Jews was not something that had characterised broadcasts before 23 August. But the reality was 
not so straightforward. As the broadcasts indicate, life remained terribly hard for Romanian Jews still 
under German or Hungarian control; but the implication that Jews were now being well treated in 
Romania itself bears further scrutiny. 
 
Before August 1944, the Jewish families and individuals (approximately 7,000 people), mostly from 
the Regat, permitted to return from Transnistria to Romania after December 1943, were mistreated 
by local authorities, beaten and forced to pay bribes. Although, as Ancel notes, the decision by a 
regime that two years earlier had promised to eradicate the Jews to permit the return of any 
survivors at all is remarkable; but at the same time as making the return passage as difficult as 
possible, the Antonescu regime still made use of antisemitism, and “linked the spectre of losing the 
war, a Soviet takeover of the country, and Jewish domination of the Romanian people.”38 Ironically, 
the Soviet occupation of Romania ended the repatriation process with 43,519 Romanian Jews from 
Bessarabia and Bukovina trapped in Transnistria; only those from southern Bukovina were now 
eligible to return, the rest were considered Soviet citizens. Only after protracted negotiations did the 
Soviets allow, on several occasions in 1945 and 1946, these Jews (and others, from Poland, Hungary, 
the Baltic States and elsewhere) to cross the border into Romania.39 
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Following Romania’s switching of sides, the racial legislation of the Antonescu era was abolished and 
all Romanians became formally equal before the law. The Defence Ministry issued an order, for 
example, on 15 November 1944, stating that differential treatment of Jews and non-Jews no longer 
had any use [nu-şi mai avea rostul astăzi], now that all racial laws had been abrogated and, 
according to the constitution now in place, all Romanian citizens, irrespective of ethnic origin, were 
equal before the law having the same rights and obligations in respect of the state.40 
 
The reality was not quite so simple. In fact, the very overturning of antisemitic legislation and the 
measures for restitution – half-hearted though they were – led to heightened popular resentment 
against Jews, according to some reports.41 One Security Service report of August 1946 claimed that 
“Hatred of the Jewish element is on the rise. Among the things contributing to this are rumours that 
Jews have come to Romania from various areas in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, and will 
remain here as settlers.” And in parts of the country from which Jews had been deported (including 
from Hungarian-occupied Northern Transylvania) Jews who tried to return to their homes were 
attacked and “dozens were murdered.”42 At best, the annulment of the fascist-era laws allowed Jews 
to rebuild their communities – insofar as this was possible – and to make efforts to emigrate but by 
no means provided compensation for their losses. Many former Legionaries who had stolen Jewish 
property were able to hold on to it until the Communists nationalised all means of production and 
shops in 1949; this included community buildings such as schools, hospitals and even a few 
synagogues, which were transferred from Legionary to state ownership in 1949.43 
 
A longstanding tradition of antisemitism was not going to disappear overnight, and the communist 
regime was not only suspicious of Judaism as a religion but made use of antisemitism as an 
expedient when the circumstances favoured doing so. An example comes from the tenancy law of 
April 1946, as reported by BBCM: 
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Minister of Justice, Patrascanu, told the press about the new tenancy law, now 
approved by the Cabinet. He had endeavoured to annul the reactionary law hitherto in 
force. The new law extends tenancies until 23rd April, 1946 for all categories of tenants. 
The tenant’s family will benefit from the law regardless of the nature of the original 
contract. Citizens of enemy countries, Rumanian citizens who have left the country 
since 23rd August, and citizens of countries which do not grant reciprocal rights to 
Rumanian subjects are excluded from its benefits. … As regards evicted Jews, all owners 
will return to their dwellings. The return of all Jewish tenants is not possible. After 
examination of all the relevant material and the opinion of social and professional 
organisations which can only be ignored at grievous risk, it has been decided that war 
widows, war invalids, war orphans, public servants, artisans and workers should be 
allowed to stay on in their present dwellings.44 
 
What BBCM did not report were the first post-Antonescu laws to restore property, the so-called 
Pătrăşcanu Laws, which resulted in returning only a small proportion of stolen Jewish property and 
ignored the fact that many Romanian beneficiaries of the race laws had quickly sold stolen goods. 
The communists, keen to entrench their power, “chose to disregard their own promises and 
proclamations about restoring Jewish property and began to defend the many Romanians who had 
taken it.”45 
 
If, in the first years after August 1944, the Jewish community in Romania – now Europe’s largest at 
some 353,000 – set about trying to re-establish itself under the leadership of Wilhelm Filderman, the 
odds were against its success. It was a traumatised and impoverished community, heavily dependent 
on charity, especially from the Joint; despite formal legislation, it continued to meet hostility and, 
furthermore, its activities were monitored and increasingly controlled by the state. On 4 March 1949 
20 
 
the Council of Ministers finally banned Jewish charities (including the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee, the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training and Organizaţia de 
Sănătate, the Jewish Health Organization) from operating in Romania, and shortly afterwards the 
community was formally cast as the Federation of Jewish Communities (Federaţia Comunităţilor 
Evreieşti) and placed under the charge of the Communist Party and the Ministry of Cults (Ministerul 
Cultelor).46 
 
Thus, by the late 1940s, a new way of life was taking shape in Romania for Jews and non-Jews alike. 
The discrepancy between what the communists preached and what they actually did or permitted to 
happen was only hinted at in the BBCM reports. One example is from a speech delivered by 
Pătrăşcanu to a group of intellectuals in December 1945: 
 
He said that the new Romania would be democratic, for she would either have to be a 
democratic state or cease to exist. “We are making persistent efforts to raise the 
standard of living of the workers and peasant. In our view, the purpose of democracy is 
to bring decent living conditions to the masses and acquaint them with culture and the 
arts. Patriotism must not mean chauvinism or anti-Semitism; the nation and the masses 
must be treated as identical concepts. Our national ideal is to awaken to consciousness 
the broad masses. Between the national ideal and our Communist faith there is no 
contradiction. On the contrary, since we are pre-occupied with the people’s needs and 
aspirations, we are actually serving the national ideal. In the past we championed our 
country’s independence; now we mean to preserve it. The people’s forces can build 
only if the nation is free. We support Socialist culture, but this culture will always 
preserve its national character. As out international outlook does not affect our 
people’s vital rights, so our national outlook must be based on close collaboration with 
the national groups in our country.”47 
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A clearer understanding of the new reality comes from other sources, as in a letter from the Jewish 
community concerning how its schools were being run. The contortions are readily apparent as the 
letter described how the meeting inaugurating “antifascist week” unfolded: 
 
The Director’s opening words dealt with resistance in the fascist period, major figures in 
Romania and abroad who opposed fascism, the evils of fascism in contrast to the 
advantages of democracy, and our debts to the efforts made to achieve victory and the 
remaking of the country.  
 
There then followed a more detailed programme during which: 
 
One of the dissertations concerned Hitlerite schools and their great errors in education. 
Another succinctly treated education in Soviet schools, with their moral and 
pedagogical advantages for the young.  
 
Finally, there was a cultural programme, with lectures by “democratic authors”, music and so on.48 
 
Of course, the fact that a Jewish school could run at all in Bucharest marks a striking change from a 
year earlier, but the particular pressures on the Jewish community, widely regarded as Soviet 
collaborators and forced by the official line effectively to become so – like everyone else – are 
especially plain. The BBC Monitoring Reports captured only part of what was in fact going on in 
postwar Romania. 
 
 
Palestine and Jewish Emigration 
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Much has been written on the Romanian communist regime’s shifting position on Jewish emigration 
at the end of World War II. Not only was the large, local Jewish population impoverished and 
beleaguered but, as we have seen, Jews from other eastern European countries had managed to find 
their way into Romania once the Soviet authorities finally gave the green light to their crossing the 
border between Transnistria and Romania. These Jews wanted to emigrate en masse, but were 
permitted to do so only in certain waves. Up to 1947 the authorities tolerated emigration both legal 
and illegal (e.g. via Yugoslavia and Italy on to brichah ships to Palestine); in 1948-49, after the 
creation of the state of Israel, Romania closed its gates to Jewish migration, in contrast to other 
eastern European states; then in 1950-51, when those same states were now preventing Jews from 
leaving, the Romanians decided to let Jews leave again, with some 100,000 departing in that last 
year or so in an indication that conditions in Romania were about as bad as they could be in postwar 
Europe. The vacillations were driven less by demand, which remained fairly constant, than by 
differences of opinion in Party leadership. As Robert Levy has shown, General Secretary Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej wanted to deny exit visas to “productive” Jews (i.e. those with skills and professions), 
whereas Foreign Minister Ana Pauker, who was herself of Jewish origin, was opposed to any 
restrictions on Jewish emigration.49 
 
These machinations and internal divisions were not advertised to the outside world and certainly do 
not form part of the BBCM reports. By contrast, and quite strikingly given the shifting positions taken 
vis-à-vis Jews, antisemitism and emigration at this time, the Romanian press had a great deal to say 
about Palestine and, later, Israel. The position it took is one that is familiar to students of the 
communist countries’ attitude towards Palestine – that is, the communists embraced the 
opportunity to humiliate the British by attacking imperialism in general and the Palestine Mandate in 
particular – but one that does not square with the regime’s position with respect to Jewish 
emigration. Only if one bears in mind the simultaneous existence of equality before the law and a 
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rejection of fascist decrees and a continued, instrumentalised antisemitism, as shown above, can 
one understand that it was entirely possible for the Romanian communists, including a number of 
prominent Jewish communists (with Pauker as an exception) to celebrate the right of Jewish self-
determination in Palestine, initially to welcome the creation of Israel, but at the same time to 
oppose allowing Romanian Jews to leave the country for Palestine. 
 
Early postwar Romanian reports on Palestine painted a picture of Arab princes in league with the 
capitalist West, preventing ordinary Jews and Arabs from fulfilling their dream of living together in 
harmony. Noting that “The Palestinian convulsions are in the focus of the interest of the whole 
world”, Romanian radio reported on a story in România Liberă which “clarifies which are the 
interests that clash in the little country on the Mediterranean coast”: 
 
After stating that one had to deal there with the desire of the Jewish and Arab peoples 
to live in peace on one hand and on the other with the desire of the Anglo-American 
imperialists to maintain their positions (?furtively), the paper unmasks the tools who 
are carrying out the plans of the monopolists. They are the so called Kings of the Arab 
countries, the stooges of the big finance of London and Washington. The paper declares 
that the annual allocation for the maintenance of Abdullah’s Arab Legion amounts to 
the nice little sum of £2,000,000. Further, ‘Romania Libera’ stresses the nazi methods 
employed by the terrorist gangs. These endeavours in Palestine can be summed up in 
this phrase: “British and American interests (?coupled) with Arab … and Nazi methods”, 
concludes the paper.50 
 
Three years later, the authorities in Romania were mobilising the Jewish population to celebrate the 
proclamation of Israel. This was clearly significant to the RCP, since it trailed the events the day 
before they occurred and reported them immediately afterwards too.51 The report of 24 May 1948 
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presented a view of events in Israel that was at odds with how they were being portrayed in the 
Western press: 
 
At a meeting yesterday, the Jewish population of Bucharest expressed its joy over the 
creation of the State of Israel and protested against the intrigues of Anglo-American 
imperialists. Events in Palestine have revealed the real meaning of Anglo-American 
policy, said one of the speakers; it is pursued to satisfy the desires of a tiny bunch of 
exploiters. Another speaker emphasised the disinterested help offered by the Soviet 
Union to the Jewish people. A telegram was sent to UN expressing the indignation felt 
by the Jews of Rumania over the Anglo-American policy of imperialism in Palestine.52 
 
The same argument was offered a few days later, this time in the wider context of postwar European 
developments. In the context of now irreversible Cold War tensions – this was just after the Marshall 
Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Prague coup and the creation of Comecon, all of which marked 
decisive moments in Cold War rivalry – the Romanian press used Israel as an object-lesson in how to 
understand Western policies in general. Stalin clearly felt betrayed by his former allies, and here 
Western policy is presented as form of banditry, as the split between the wartime allies is 
understood as the West “reverting to type”, shamelessly abandoning the Soviet Union in favour of 
rehabilitating fascists: 
 
Discussing palestine problem in light of whole jewish question, today’s Scanteia says 
that solution of palestine problem depends on destruction of last remnants of fascism 
and … everywhere. Whilst mosley freely propagates antisemitism and united states 
practice racial discrimination, writes scanteia, whilst in germany and italy racial 
prejudices are reborn under american protection, antisemitism has been successfully 
fought in soviet union and in new democracies. Just as victory of progressive and 
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democratic forces in many countries contributes to definite solution of jewish problem 
in respective countries, so establishment and consolidation of jewish state in palestine 
can only be result of victory of world wide democratic and antiimperialist camp.53 
 
Conclusion 
 
The BBC Monitoring reports only recorded what the international media wanted to broadcast; it is 
no criticism of BBCM to say that its transcripts paint a very partial understanding of the events they 
describe. When placed in context, the broadcasts remain a highly revealing and useful set of sources, 
for they speak to the self-understanding and self-presentation of the regimes that sent them out 
into the world. In the specific case of Romania, we see with both the fascist-cum-military 
dictatorship and the communist regime that there is often an enormous gulf between the claims 
made in the broadcasts and what we know from other sources. Nevertheless, it is still possible to be 
surprised by the frankness and stirring rhetoric that one sometimes encounters. In November 1945, 
the Russian writer, Ilya Ehrenburg, co-author with Vasily Grossman of the Black Book of Soviet Jewry, 
a 1946 report on the Holocaust in the Soviet Union which was suppressed two years later, gave a 
lecture in Budapest which was reported on in the Romanians’ Hungarian-language service. It is 
important to be cynical in the face of these sort of humanitarian claims from Soviet authors; at the 
same time, it is hard not to be moved and it is even harder to believe that a man such as Ehrenburg 
could have said these words without meaning them. It is easy to imagine the BBCM monitors 
recording such statements many times over as they listened to broadcasts from the Soviet Union 
and its new satellites in eastern Europe. That does not detract from the fact that the message is one 
that remains meaningful: 
 
Ehrenburg said Budapest reminded him of the Russian towns devastated by the 
Germans and pointed to the price Russia paid for victory. “But this victory is not only 
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ours, it is also that of Europe and mankind. Europe was devastated by the racial idea 
and in the name of German superiority, they wiped out cities and killed millions of 
people. Victory is won, but it is not enough to wipe out the Fascists on the battlefield. 
Our soldiers have done their duty; now it is up to the intellectuals to banish German 
darkness. Today it is not the underground Fascist organisations which constitute a 
danger but the prejudice remaining in the people’s hearts. It is the intelligentsia’s task 
to eliminate this danger. We must be on guard for mankind cannot survive another 
Oswiecim and Majdanek.”54 
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